THE CONTENT OF COURSES IN LEGISLATION
By WIILARD

HURST*

EGISLATION still has to win its place in most law schools as a
Iseparate focus of the curriculum. Those who see in this situation
a fundamental weakness of the typical law training will welcome
the publication of Professor Horack's casebook,x both as a stimulus to
schools not yet experimenting, and as a suggestive base of comparison to
those already testing their own ideas. Four years of trial and error in this
field at Wisconsin do not entitle me to the dogmatism of writing a standard
review of a casebook whose editor, after ten years of background work,
finds his "undertaking hazardous and the result experimental." But they
do permit exchange and criticism of experience in an area where aims and
methods are still wide open for discussion.
The importance of legislation in the body of the law today, from a
statute of Congress to a regulation of an industrial commission or an
ordinance of a city council, is a commonplace. Further, there has been a
growing separation and specialization of the agencies which determine
policy and formulate standards and rules. And as policy is expressed in
more and more inclusive and complicated regulations, its practical significance depends increasingly upon the skill and sympathy of those who
are engaged in its interpretation and application. The specialization of
the policy-making function and the heightened importance of policy application mean that lawmen have greater need for a working philosophy
and trained intuition in the adjustment of the relationships of legal
agencies.
LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

The conventional curriculum can offer the student little opportunity to
become acquainted with essential problems in the functioning of the legislative process itself. A good deal of the law relating to the machinery of
legislation-introduction of bills, consideration before committee and the
full house, executive action-is straightforward, matter-of-fact doctrine
on which background reading should suffice, without encroachment upon
classroom hours. Professor Horack's chapter on "Legislative Organiza* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
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tion and Procedure" follows the common-sense line of recent casebook
construction, in using extensive editorial notes to present such material.
His text, moreover, overruling departmental boundaries, seeks to place
the legal issues in the living context of the political problems involved in
legislative mechanics. Particularly important is the emphasis on the committee system. Indeed, the lawyer's job as advocate in the legislative
process so centers on the committee stage, in the presentation of evidence
and argument or in the representation of a client called to act as a witness,
as to deserve more attention than the editor allows

it.2

Three legal issues of legislative procedure, two involving the committee stage, possess the root importance, the movement and the color which
call for discussion. In the first place, Professor Horack does not, curiously,
explore the extent to which due process may require notice and hearing
for the enactment of legislative regulations. The question provokes illuminating comparison of legislative, judicial, executive and administrative action, and illustrates how the lawyer's concerns tie in closely with
the hard facts of government in operation. 3 Secondly, the presentation of
evidence before legislative committees raises issues which are warmly contested and in flux. A drastically edited version of McGrainv. Daugherty4 is
inadequate to convey an impression of the movement of doctrine regarding the compulsion of testimony.5 Further, legislative records should be
searched for material upon which to discuss standards of scope and procedure in the presentation of evidence in committee hearings. Incidents in
the conduct of the Dies Committee, for example, underline the need for
the development within legislative tribunals themselves of canons of selfrestraint and precedents of fair and orderly procedure in investigation.
As a practical matter, judicial control will be exerted only in extreme cases
and then only to enforce constitutional guaranties of minimum decencies;
2 Concise editorial comment might well supplant the substantial case treatment given
questions of executive approval and veto.
3 See, e.g., Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345 (i888); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (igi5); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); cf. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937). The editor
emphasizes similarities in the functioning of the legislative and judicial processes. See Horack,
The Common Law of Legislation, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 41 (i937). The issue of jurisdictional prerequisites to valid judicial decision is fundamental. It would seem integral to Professor Horack's approach, thus, to consider the question of when notice and hearing may be prerequisite to valid legislative adjudication.

4 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
5 Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1o3 U.S. 168 (i8o); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (i908);

Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); Hearst v. Black, 87 F. (2d) 68 (App. D.C. 1936).
Here also excellent secondary material is available for use with the cases.
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and there are sound reasons why judicial intervention should go no
further. Standards in respect to qualification of witnesses, cross-examination, order of rebuttal, and limitations upon irrelevant and prejudicial
matter must be the product of the legislators' own practice. To draw from
the body of committee practice sound principles and rules as to these matters is a task peculiarly within the sphere of lawmen. The schools' work in
Legislation might here make another of many contributions to the working of government.
Of the legal issues involved in the operation of legislative machinery, a
third deserves emphasis. There is a familiar conflict in the decisions regarding the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill as against the evidence of
the legislative journals, and of the journals as against still other evidence,
in establishing the text of a statute and in determining compliance with
constitutional requirements of legislative procedure. This conflict of doctrine is -fundamental to the litigation of all questions of the validity of
legislative procedure in enactment. Professor Horack underlines this importance by placing the issue at the outset of his treatment of procedural
questions. But the deeper significance of the cases, for teaching purposes,
lies in the issue of judicial self-limitation, here presented in the highly
practical terms of a recurrent problem. This aspect loses force, however,
when the conflict of the enrolled bill versus the journal is presented only in
the context of legislative mechanics and is not related to the policy questions central to the interpretation of statutes.
THE PRESSURE BACKGROUND OF LEGISLATION

Apart from legislative machinery, the standard curriculum ignores the
extremely important problems which center about the pressure background and around the drafting of legislation. The average law student is
an average citizen, in his vague conception that legislation originates
either in the initiative of statesmen or among "lobbyists," a term which to
him bears exclusively sinister connotations. The shallowness of conventional ideas as to the sources of legislation is fertile ground for unintelligent
and reactionary disillusion with representative government. In speaking
for a more realistic understanding of the pressures behind law making, the
law school can make a significant contribution towards developing intelligent citizenship in its students and in the communities in which they as
lawyers will exercise influence.
The relation of this emphasis to professional training is clear. As counsel, the lawyer is increasingly concerned with predicting legislative action.
As advocate before legislators, he needs a sound philosophy as to the
proper scope of his job. As advocate, judge, or commissioner in a tribunal
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applying legislative regulations, his approach will inevitably be conditioned by some theory of the respect or suspicion which is due the legislative adjustments of community conflicts. Pre-law political science courses
may contribute to a general point of view. But here, as is the case regarding the machinery of legislating, the problems go so to the heart of the
lawyer's job that the law school needs to pursue the study at the professional level. As it is, a short experience convinces one that few students
now obtain even the first factors of a mature political philosophy from
their pre-law work. Whatever the proper assessment of responsibility for
this failure, the fact justifies the inclusion of a good deal of rather elementary statement in Professor Horack's chapter on "Influencing Legislative
Action." Altogether, this chapter offers materials whose breadth and realism sharply challenge conventionally narrow notions of the background of
legislative activity. Consideration is not restricted to influences operating
directly upon the legislator-his background, the pressure of newspaper
and voter and of private and governmental lobbyists. In addition, attention is given to "pre-legislative influences" of organized interest groups
and to the effects of the dislocations of social conflict and the inadequacies
of private or governmental dealings with them, as provoking statutory
change. Restrained pessimism characterizes a review of efforts to regulate
election practices and lobbying, with the sound implication that political
health cannot be produced by affidavits and lawsuits. 6
THE CRITICAL CHOICES IN LEGISLATING

The lawyer today does not have to wait to be elected to public office to
become concerned with the drafting of laws. His client's affairs may not
reach the dignity of Congressional or state legislation, but there may be
the matter of an administrative rule or a county or municipal ordinance
to be sponsored, or amendments or substitutions to be drawn as counter
moves to proposals by someone else. In any case, he must be more than a
mere draftsman, since prior to the business of actually framing legislation
there are choices to be made as to content. Professor Horack's casebook
excels other Legislation materials which I have had the opportunity to
examine in the fullness with which he seeks to outline basic questions of
'7
"The Formulation of Legislative Policy."
6Reference might have been made to the Hatch Act and its amendment, and the materials
on regulation of lobbying might include or refer to data from the Canons of Ethics and Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association. See Canons 26 and 36; Opinions 8, 26, 98, 148. Discussion of the courts' reluctance to
enforce contracts for lobbying services should be compared to the ruling of Fletcher v. Peck,
6 Cranch (U.S.) *87 (r8io), denying the admissibility of evidence offered to prove corruption
in the enactment of a statute.
7 See Horack, op. cit. supra note i, at c. i.
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There are four such basic questions: (3) whether government should
intervene in a given situation at all; (2) which agency should determine
policy-legislature, administrative or local government body, the electorate itself, or private groups under government control; (3) what policy
should be adopted; and (4) how the policy should be enforced. The law
school cannot claim professional competence in the ultimate choices to be
made in categories (i) and (3). The lawyer's peculiar competence extends
no further than to indicate how the choice of legislative agency and of
sanctions may or should shape and limit the basic decisions of whether to
legislate and what to legislate. Even so restricted, his claims to expert
status rest more on default of contestants and on the hazardous intuitions
of "common sense" than on any respectable amount of research. Before
we can expect a really satisfactory treatment of these problems, we must
do a good bit of spade work in the comparative study of official agencies
and of sanctions.
It is a reflection upon the lack of solid research in the field generally,
then, and not upon the editor's job, to say that the bulk of his source
materials here are descriptive rather than critical. The editorial notes
bristle with suggestive questions, and carry shrewd comments of a practical nature, derived doubtless from the editor's experience as a legislative counsel. But for the student, questions and notes are relatively barren unless set against a rich record of legislative experience in a field such
as this, where expertness must be sought not in terms of formulae but of
trained intuition. The bulk of presently available materials-the constitutional and statutory provisions and judicial opinions thereunder--set the
framework within which the selection of types of regulations and sanctions must operate. These available materials can illustrate alternative
choices. They do not furnish ultimately significant data to guide the
choice. This is a point where good treatise material might best be used as
the background for discussion of problem cases. But the treatises can be
written only on the foundation of specialized studies of which we now have
only a scattering.'
9 Cf. Horack, Federal-State Co-operation for Social Security: The Grant-in-Aid, 3o Ill. L.
Rev. 292 (1935) (excerpts in the casebook); Radin, Popular Legislation in California, 23 Minn.
L. Rev. 559 (i939); Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 Yale LJ. 22 (1929);
Merwin, Public Relations in Selected Wisconsin Administrative Departments (1937) (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wisconsin). Professor Horack presents the fundamental
problem, of whether legislative power should be exercised at all in a given situation, in a short
but lively section juxtaposing the dogmatism of Herbert Spencer and the factual approach of
Dean Pound. As indicated in the text, I do not believe it within the proper sphere of the law
curriculum to attempt a more lengthy exploration of ultimate social values. The casebook
might well, however, suggest to the student a comparison of the policy issues here with those
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Meanwhile, the present casebook demonstrates that imaginative selection and arrangement of available materials may broaden horizons. Two
aspects of Professor Horack's treatment are important contributions to
the student's realistic appreciation of the legal system. It directs particular attention to the possibilities of indirect regulation, as by the grant-inaid and by regulation through private associations subject to state supervision. Again, the facts of continuity and precedent in the evolution of
legislative policy are stressed as being significant factors in the appraisal
of the pressure background and the interpretation of statute law.
PROBLEMS OF DRAYTSMANSHIP

Probably the most important lessons in the drafting of legislation cannot be taught, but can be gathered only from apprenticeship. Viewing the
problem from another angle, many of the legal issues affecting the framing
of legislation, like most of those regarding legislative machinery, involve
relatively simple and uninspiring material concerning formal constitutional requirements or straightforward devices of arrangement and expression for clarifying the internal structure and meaning of a statute. Questions of construction are of course also involved where the internal structure of the act is relied upon to clarify intention. But, whether the emphasis in questions of punctuation, for example, or the use of permissive
and mandatory verbs, be on draftsmanship or interpretation, the elementary character of much of the material recommends the use of a background text plus problem cases in the framing of typical provisions. Professor Horack's arrangement largely follows this device, though the case
treatment of some subjects, notably statute titles, seems over-generous.
The casebook, however, does not adequately exploit the possibilities of
two very suggestive topics concerning draftsmanship. The first is that of
constitutional limitations on special and local legislation. These limitations find expression in a remarkable amount of litigation. They were developed out of the experience of legislative excesses during certain periods
of economic exploitation, and there is good reason for inquiring into their
continued justification and their aptness today to meet the abuses at
which they were aimed. Moreover, the cases, continually raising embarof substantive due process. Compare Stone, J., for the Court, in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 279 (1928) ("It would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within
its borders to go on unchecked."). This portion of the casebook might also be integrated with
the treatment of strict and liberal construction. Compare Cardozo, J., for the Court, in
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933) ("The construction that is liberal to one taxpayer may be illiberal to others").
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rassing issues of form versus substance in the satisfaction of these constitutional limitations, pose questions significant in other fields.
The second problem in draftsmanship, the implications of which justify
broader development than this casebook affords, is that of exact expression. A statute may be so indefinite as to violate due process of law. If it
is not self-executing, but confers rule-making power upon administrators,
the validity of its generality is tested by the more lenient doctrines of
delegation of powers. Professor Horack includes basic cases on indefiniteness. But he slights the comparison with delegation doctrine, with its implications for the draftsman in respect to the problems of choice of agendes and types of regulation and sanctions. 9 Moreover, a wider and richer
assortment of material than the constitutional decisions afford is necessary to realize the potentialities of this issue of exact expression. Probably
the most fruitful job that a drafting course can hope to accomplish lies in
this area, where skill with words must be linked with patience and intelligent appreciation of the facts of the situation to be regulated. The casebook for the course might present the student with exercises in drafting
regulatory clauses against the background of stated facts, both of a technical and a rule-of-thumb character, in typical industrial or commercial or
governmental problems."' Such work should stress the strategic relation
between precision or calculated generality in expression and the problem
of enforcement.
The due process decisions on indefinite statutory language have obvious
importance for the draftsman. They also impress a lesson in advocacy.
They teach that if the constitutional requirement is to be applied intelligently, counsel must see that judges appraise statutory terms with adequate understanding of their factual context and of the practical difficulties faced by those who framed the words to meet the facts. The point will
be reinforced if the casebook furnishes some experience in drawing provisions to deal with the raw material of the facts involved in regulatory
9 Study of United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), and Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), which the editor reprints, would gain measurably from
the inclusion of United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932), where
the Court approved delegation language not dissimilar to that held invalid in the self-executing
statutes involved in the other cases. Juxtaposition of Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924),
with United States v. Ballard, 12 F. Supp. 321 (Ky. x935), which the editor reprints, and with
In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682, 209 Pac. 896 (1922), would suggest the dangers of destructive confusion when a self-executing statute is measured by the too lenient test of delegation doctrine,
or a delegating statute is found wanting under the too stringent tests of indefiniteness. Compare also United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892).
zo Cf. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (x918); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,
266 U.S. 497 (1925); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Campbell
v. New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 155 N.E. 628 (X927).
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situations. From these aspects the problem of exact expression also is integral to the study of interpretation. The present casebook, however, does
little to suggest features of this relationship. It should, for example, call
attention to the fact that due process limitations upon indefinite legislation may restrict the application of some familiar canons of construction."'
Thus the casebook might question whether due process in this respect
limits the operation of implied repeal or the interpretation of statutes in
parimateria.- Or it might suggest that the incidence of doctrines of strict
construction may sometimes be better understood when these doctrines
are observed as expressions of policies similar to that expressed in the due
process doctrine.'
THE STUDY OF INTERPRETATION

The central problems of interpretation, it might be urged, pervade all
courses today and are best handled there. The missionary for Legislation
instruction will be content to the extent that his work is further incorporated into the standard subjects, where statutes can be presented in
their living context and continuity to a degree denied, by limitations of
time and space, to the specialized course. Complete incorporation, however, is an insufficient ideal and one not shortly to be realized. Even when
full credit is given, there remains the essential need for helping the student
form a working philosophy of the proper relation between law-maker and
law-applier. And this job cannot be done adequately without an attempt
to convey some practical sense of what constitutes good advocacy, in addition to presenting statutory materials in the matrix of the facts of community life from which statute law comes. The whole task is too critical
and too large to be squeezed into the crowded confines of existing courses.
Frailties of foresight and expression, and the impact of variety and
change in the situations regulated, mean that judges and administrators
must legislate interstitially in statute as well as in common law. Those
who thus legislate in the application of policy must do so with a sympa11See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 50o, ,z8 (1926) (a statute will not be construed in
a way to avoid a grave constitutional question where the alternative construction itself is unfairly indefinite); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 564 (1931) (construction of statute invalid in
some applications as intended to operate wherever application would be constitutional will
not be made where scope of act would thereby be rendered unfairly indefinite). See Horack,
op. cit. supra note i, at 692 n. 1, 780 n. r.
X See State v. Wentler, 76 Wis. 89, 44 N.W. 841 (I890).
13 See Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1935).
This suggestion should be compared with the cases included by the editor relative to the
question whether more stringent requirements of definiteness apply to penal than to civil
statutes. Compare Cardozo, J., in Campbell v. New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 329, 155 N.E. 628,
63z (1927), with A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
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thetic comprehension of policy, if we are to have the substance of representative government, and if government is not to be stalled by interagency conflict. This need makes the concept of the "intention of the
legislature" the central one in the study of interpretation. Of what propositions is the concept formed? What is its significance as a canon of selfrestraint in the administration of legislative regulations? How should we
assess its reality or lack of reality in light of the facts as to how legislative
and adjudicative functions are conducted?
The best of judicial opinions are relatively barren stuff with which to
introduce this field, and there are few enough which are compounded of
anything but empty generalities. Insight and time will be gained by generous use of secondary readings, though this is another point at which
construction of the ideal Legislation casebook awaits more spadework in
specialized background studies. Professor Horack begins his selection with
a bow towards semantics, and also prints extracts from the classic exchange of Radin and Landis and from his own suggestive commentary on
this debate. 4 This is all first-rate, except that the editing is too drastic.
In view of the fundamental and subtle character of the issues, the student
ought to have a chance to sharpen his understanding on the full text of
explorations and arguments by able thinkers. Moreover, in eliminating
portions of the Radin-Landis exchange dealing most particularly with the
rationale of the judicial obligation to follow legislative intention, once
ascertained, the editor needlessly obscures the deepest implications of the
problem.
For discussion based upon the secondary readings, decisions pursuing
the "equity of the statute," where the law because of its generality or its
particularity covers too much or too little, contrast well with decisions
insisting on the compelling force of the "literal" meaning. The editor's
selection here is stimulating and acquaints the student with some of those
few decisions entitled to be called "leading cases" in interpretation.' s
There is ample room for experiment in selection of case material focusing
on the question of the "intention of the legislature." For example, the
rationale of that concept and the definition of the proper scope for judicial
action in filling statutory gaps, are nowhere better presented than in questions of the applicability of statutes to states of fact not existent or reasonably foreseeable at the time of enactment. As problems for sound adX4 Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (193o); Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (i93o); Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. Va. L. Q. i19 (1932).
is Notably, Church of The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (892), and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In both instances the editing, again, seems too
severe.
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vocacy and decision, such cases are lively teaching material and would
repay a more detailed treatment than the limits of this casebook allow.' 6
Inextricably linked with the fundamental concept of legislative intent,
of course, is the use of data extrinsic to the statute for purposes of interpreting it. Professor Horack's arrangement is admirably calculated to
arouse the student's imagination to the possibilities here, comparing the
use of legislative documents with evidence of administrative interpretation, judicial notice of the history of the times, the accretion of interpretative precedent, and the effect of practical construction by the parties affected. Shortcomings are, again, not of inclusion but of omission. Thus,
the casebook's material on the use of legislative records tends to be merely
descriptive of rules, and only meagerly reflects the growth toward liberal
doctrine in this area. In addition, the cases are too much cut to the bare
bones of doctrine to furnish the student adequate data for appraising the
merits of evidence drawn from legislative records. At another point, the
casebook reprints colorful examples of committee hearings and reports and
floor debate, but the value of these extracts would be greater if they could
be drawn from the history of statutes later involved in cases treating the
use of such extrinsic evidence. In a course where the bulk of the material
necessary to convey the sense of living law will always cause practical
difficulties, there is a highly utilitarian reason for selecting materials capable of double duty. Contrasting English material on the use of extrinsic
sources for interpretation is not presented. Reprints from a pair of good,
adversary briefs would, in any event, probably furnish teaching material
superior to cases at this point.
INTERPRETATION: TIE ROLE OF TIE ADVOCATE

Whether regarded as training for sound advocacy or decision, the theme
on which the study of interpretation should play many variations is that
of tireless insistence on uncovering all the very particular facts of history
and policy in which a given interpretative problem is imbedded. After the
discussion of the central concept of legislative intention, we can safely
forego generalization as a major emphasis and stress particularity. It is
in the latter aspect that the typical approach in judicial opinion or law6
'1
Cf., e.g., Doherty v. Inhabitants of Ayer, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N.E. 677 (I9O8) (automobile

not a "carriage" within an 1882 act requiring that town roads be maintained in condition
safe for carriages); Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 287 Pa. ix6, i 3 4 Atl. 404 (1926),
rev'd on other grounds 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (application of 1889 tax act to taxicab companies);
Fox Film Corporation's Application, 295 Pa. 461, 145 Atl. 5z4 (1929) (application of I9r5
movie censorship act to sound pictures). Comparison should be made with the question of
applicability of constitutional provisions to changed conditions. Cf. Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) (telegraph operations within commerce clause).
See Holmes, J., in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920).
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yer's brief is most fumbling. "But every question of construction is
unique, and an argument that would prevail in one case may be inadequate in another."' 17 This emphasis is simply stated, but not easily
taught, as anyone who has tried it, knows.
Two types of problems are particularly adapted to this end; a major
lack in the present casebook is that it does not supply adequate material
for their exploration. Both source and secondary materials should be presented in variety sufficient to demonstrate the diverse ideas of policy and
assumptions of fact which the decisions and treatises lump together under
single "rules" of strict and liberal construction. Such worn admonitions as
those counseling the strict construction of penal statutes or of statutes in
derogation of the common law should be broken down into the different
choices and emotions which they express, and a more particular rationale
demanded of each particular line of decision."5 The second question deserving emphasis, though in logical symmetry it may not classify as the
study of interpretation, is that of the use of statutes by analogy to furnish
principles or standards of decision at common law.' 9 Frequent resort to
penal statutes in defining standards of prudent conduct in civil actions for
negligence and in the definition of contracts illegal as contrary to public
policy recommends these examples for development. Doctrine is still confused and technique uncertain in this use of legislative material. Proper
appreciation of the utility of statutory materials for these ends depends
peculiarly upon familiarity with the legislative process and sound habits
of craftsmanship in searching out the factual background of legislation.
Adequately investigated, the problems demand more time than the limits
of torts and contracts courses allow.2° And there is a deeper justification
for time spent in discussing the analogical use of statutes. The student,
Holmes, J., in United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916).
21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (zgo8), and Hall,
Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv.L. Rev. 748 (1935), provide fertile
ground for discussion, in combination with varied case material. Cf. Jennings, Courts and
Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation, 49 Harv.L. Rev. 426
(1936); Pound, The Formative Era of American Law c. n (1938); Stone, The Common Law in
the United States, So Harv.L. Rev. 4 (1936); Harvard Tercentenary Publications: The Future
of the Common Law i2o (1937). See Horack, op. cit. supra note i, at 551 n. I, 552 n. 2.
"gInterpretative use of statutes in pari materia and resort to fundamental legislation or
lines of legislative development to supply guiding principles of construction in broad areas of
regulation are topics more strictly within the category of interpretation which should be integrated in discussion with the question of analogical use of statutes. Cf. Karnuth v. United
States, 279 U.S. 231, 243 (1929); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269, 270 (934); Wisconsin
Granite Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 208 Wis. 270, 279, 242 N.W. i91, 194 (1932).
2* Compare Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Minn. L. Rev.
361 (1932), with Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 Harv.L. Rev.
453 (1933). See Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Col. L. Rev. 679 (1935).
17

18Thus Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
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as the judge or lawyer, tends to regard the statute book simply as a rule
book, of no concern to him unless he finds written there a specific answer
to his problem. Nothing is better calculated to dissipate this provincialism and to reveal the statute book as a flexible and enriching source for
creative legal thinking than the study of statutes not as rules but as responsible findings of fact and expressions of felt needs of society.
THeE ARRANGEMENT OF LEGISLATION COURSES

Listing the types of legislative problems which deserve specialized
treatment does not answer the question of how to organize these problems
into a course. The arrangement and content of Professor Horack's casebook imply that at best Legislation will be allotted one course in the curriculum, probably a single semester of two or three hours. It is dear that
the editor would regard this allocation as based upon practical and not
ideal considerations. His collection represents about as sound a piece of
construction as is likely to be done for a course of this scope. Because the
book is a good job, its inadequacies are the more persuasive of the essential
inadequacy of an attempt to handle Legislation within the confines of a
single volume. Most of the criticisms that may be made of the casebook
relate not to its conception of the scope of the field or its ordering of topics,
but to the sketchiness of its materials. Yet, even as it stands, it is too full
to fit comfortably into a single course.
LEGISLATION IN AN ORIENTATION COURSE

A practical solution may lie in emphasizing the legislative process as
part of a first-year orientation course, upon which can be built advanced
work in the legislative function and the interpretation of statutes. At
Wisconsin we have begun such an experiment with the establishment of an
orientation course which we call Law in Society.21 Meeting four times a
week for one semester, the course begins with twelve hours of lectures and
discussions describing and comparing the structure and functions of major
legal agencies and raising basic questions of the meaning of law and the
nature of interests. Extensive editorial comment and excerpts from secondary readings make up most of the reading matter in this opening portion, though illustrative case and statutory materials are also employed.
The whole is given continuity by its arrangement about a framework provided by the record and opinions reprinted from a case involving judicial
review of an administrative award under the Wisconsin workmen's compensation act. The various materials are thus invoked successively to explain the significance of the stages in this actual litigation.
21

Compare the use of legislation in the first year program at the Law School of Columbia

University. See Parkinson, Cases and Materials on Legislation (rev. ed. 1936).
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Following this introduction, the remaining three-quarters of the
course are built upon material reflecting the evolution of legal doctrine
pertaining to industrial accident. After a discussion of the earliest English and American cases creating the fellow servant rule, attention is concentrated entirely on Wisconsin sources reflecting the turning points in
the Wisconsin development from common law, through employers'-liability legislation, to the compensation act. Materials are not confined to
statutes and cases, but include excerpts from briefs of counsel and from
legislative, executive and administrative records, portions of party platforms, and of the minutes of proceedings of leading pressure groups such
as the state federation of labor, together with first-hand accounts of the
background of the compensation act by persons prominent in its enactment.
Only half the readings, however, involves the problem of industrial accident. The remainder consists of treatise and law review selections discussing general juristic problems implicit in the industrial accident materials. Thus, after the first cases on the fellow servant rule, readings are introduced regarding the nature of conflicts of interests, the litigious process
as a method of law-making in the adjustment of conflicts, and limitations
of ignorance and economic bias in the judicial process. Again, Wisconsin
cases giving restrictive interpretation to early employers'-liability legislation are presented in conjunction with readings discussing elementary
concepts of judicial responsibility toward statute law, the continuity of
legislative policy, and the historical and emotional background of the
"rule" of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law.
At every point possible, the effort is made to integrate the discussion of the
secondary readings with the implications of the primary sources studied.
Several basic points in the theory of the course are relevant to the practical problems of teaching Legislation. First, concentration upon the evolution of legal efforts to meet a particular community problem places the
legislative process in living comparison with judicial and administrative
activity. There is scope in such a course especially for detailed comparison
of litigious and legislative law-making.- Second, focusing the course upon
the unfolding of a single problem gives the time and space necessary to a
convincing re-creation of the life and movement behind fundamental legislation. Professor Horack makes good use of this device in a more limited
fashion; for example, to introduce his consideration of interpretation, he
uses successive statutory and case material regarding the application of the
-The Wisconsin course, from limitations of time, considers different legal agencies with
reference chiefly to policy-making and does not undertake any extensive exploration of problems of sanctions.

COURSES IN LEGISLATION

anti-trust laws to trade union activity.23 In whatever degree adopted,
such continuity of materials on some connected topic seems essential to a
convincing presentation of important aspects of legislation.24
The third emphasis in the construction of the course is the integration
of primary sources with secondary readings, in about equal bulk. Text
material in current casebooks is apt to be drained of its natural vigor and
color because excerpts are restricted to the minimum necessary to convey
the writer's thesis. Such drastic editing is justifiable where text is substituted for cases simply because it is a more efficient means of conveying
information. But in statutory interpretation, for example, the difficulty
with the cases is that their doctrine is muddled and vague and filled with
question-begging generalities. What the student needs here is opportunity
to gain a sense of direction and perspective and to toughen his mind by
pitting the rationalizations of legislative and judicial language against
the wit and penetration of good essayists. For this he must be given not
snippets but the ful body of chapters and articles. This generosity will
probably mean that within the practicable limits of the casebook one can
"cover" less ground, but the test of material is in maturity and not area.
Finally, material in the Wisconsin orientation course has been selected
and arranged wherever possible to emphasize the responsibilities and opportunities of sound counsel and advocacy. It is important to train future
legislators, judges, and commissioners. Most law students, however, wil
not hold public office. Yet, what government can accomplish is inseparably related to the attitudes and training which the bar brings to problems
23 Thus, he also employs connected series of materials on the regulation of building construction, gambling, and milk to bring out points concerning the formulation of legislative policy.
Excerpts from committee and floor consideration of the Securities Exchange Act lend reality
to the chapter on legislative procedure; I have suggested above that it would be desirable if
material selected at this point could relate to questions later actually in litigation. The chapter on the pressure background of legislation is built around materials illustrating different
phases of the struggle for regulation of hours of labor over the course of a century. The treatment here seems less successful; perhaps concentration on a more limited period or issue would
be desirable.
24Primary sources used in the Wisconsin orientation course are almost entirely drawn from

Wisconsin records; out-of-state materials are brought into the picture only at decisive points
where the Wisconsin evolution touched outside influences. The basis of selection is not parochial pride. So long as the problem dealt with is important and has left a rich and colorful
record, such concentration upon events in one line of development within one jurisdiction
seems most likely to create for the student a convincing sense of the continuity and depth of
policy. The greater variety and detail of documents generally available with reference to Congressional legislation might suggest that the framework of such a course would better be
found in some important line of federal policy. The bulk of the average lawman's concern,
however, is with state law, and the very generosity of federal sources makes their study
somewhat atypical; closer to the student's needs may be training in searching out and using
the scantier sources in the background of state policy.
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of government. Proper understanding of regulatory issues by official
agencies is measurably conditioned by the breadth and imagination in
lawyers' presentations of the interests involved. Moreover, only a small
part of the necessary ordering of a democratic society can be done by the
official agencies. Legislation, decision, and administration go forward in
every law office. The lawyer's day-to-day work of consultation, draftsmanship, compromise, demand, and enforcement, and the wisdom which
go into these, are critically important to making the wheels go around in
an organized community. It is no empty phrase to say that the lawyer is
an officer of the court; indeed, more accurately, he is an officer of the state.
But law courses still leave largely unspoken the implications of their materials for training in the wisdom and craftsmanship of the counsellor and
advocate. Previous lack of exploration particularly demands more explicit stress on these aspects of the lawman's relation to the shaping and
application of legislative policy.
ADVANCED LEGISLATION coUsEs

The elementary study of the legislative process in such an orientation
course should lay the foundation and save the time of advanced courses.
Legislative organization and procedure, the pressure background of legislation, and draftsmanship with its underlying choices as to type of regulation and sanctions, are important in their own right. They are also obviously desirable background for the study of interpretation. If possible,
they should be formed into an advanced three-hour semester course given
as a prerequisite to three hours in the second term for study of interpretation. Practical limitations may not permit this generosity. In that case,
even allowing for the benefits of a first-year foundation course, it seems
wiser not to attempt to touch all of the detailed problems in a single semester course. A defensible choice, which I have thought justified by experience, is a three-hour semester course centering on the concept of the intention of the legislature, around which may be built the problems of the
use of extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, of doctrines of strict and liberal construction, and of the use of statutes by analogy in tort and contract litigation. The first third of this course, moreover, I have devoted
to materials concerning the scope and technique of trials involving issues
of the constitutionality of statutes: the concept of political questions, the
transitional doctrine of the finality of the enrolled bill to establish statutory text and procedural validity, and a detailed study of the "presumption of constitutionality" as determinative of the burden of proof and of
the procedure in the trial of issues of constitutional fact.25 There is more
2s Cf. Parkinson, op. cit. supra note 21, at c. M.
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room in Legislation than in the constitutional law course for adequate
consideration of the trial of constitutional issues. There, also, it provides
a first rate introduction to the study of interpretation. For the canons of
judicial self-limitation and the insistence upon full exploration of facts
conditioning the validity of statutes, which are expressed in the "presumption of constitutionality," set out in broader and simpler strokes the
ideas which are fundamental in appraising the process of statutory interpretation.
Today administrative legislation presents a new center of interest, raising its own problems of draftsmanship, representation and activity of pressure groups, and interpretation of rules. To assume that legislative problems are alike, without regard to the peculiar structure and tasks of the
law-making body, begs fundamental questions. Though practical limitations will concentrate study on the functioning of the principal legislature,
appraisal will be keener by constant comparison with problems of statute
making by administrative and local government bodies. Professor Horack
indicates that he would integrate the content of the courses in legislation
and administrative law, to develop this sort of comparison. That seems
a highly practical solution, as it also suggests how emphasis on legislative
problems may lend new vigor to the established curriculum. But comparative study of legislative problems in the context of different agencies has
too much immediate relevance to the study of Legislation to be left mainly
to other courses. The present casebook stresses material dealing with the
choice of law-making body, as a problem in the formulation of policy. It
should develop this approach more fully, however, and especially should
an advanced Legislation course present issues of interpretation as they
may vary according to the problems and capacities of the various types of
statute-making agencies.
From a detailed consideration of the desirable content of Legislation
instruction there emerges something much more complex than merely the
matter of adding a course to the law curriculum. What is needed is the
integration of a new emphasis into the whole law training. The justification for that effort runs so deep into the law school's responsibilities for
education in the philosophy and craftsmanship of the profession, that it
cannot be denied in the reformation of the curriculum to meet the needs
of our society. These responsibilities are not met by offering a Legislation
seminar to a handful of students. Granted, there is pressing need for
plenty of seminar research. Still, the goal must be the creation of courses
of general instruction which shall become a root part of every student's
legal education.

